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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the development and scope of the doctrine of 
economic duress. It argues that expansion of the doctrine of duress to 
include the exercise of economic pressure requires a set of consistent 
principles of application if the doctrine is to be a useful tool in curbing 
unacceptable commercial pressures. The courts have so far failed to 
provide a clear test for determining the existence of economic duress. A 
part of the reason for this is the lingering effect of the "overborne will 
theory." This theory acts as a conceptual bar to the development of a 
responsive and predictable test for economic duress. This paper 
supports the modern test for duress proposed by Lord Scarman in 
Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Workers' 
Federation [ 1982] AC 366 and identifies illegitimacy of pressure as the 
key element in a principled development of the doctrine of economic 
duress. Finally a comprehensive test for establishing the illegitimacy of 
pressure is proposed based on the concept of bad faith. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 12,500 words. 
ECONOMIC DURESS BY THREATENED BREACH 
OF CONTRACT 
I INTRODUCTION 
The existence of the doctrine of duress is illustrative of the law's 
willingness, in certain circumstances, to interfere in relationships which, on their 
face, appear entirely consistent with the general law. Claims for duress arise 
where a party has applied pressure to another in order to coerce that other party 
to enter an agreement or to take some other action. An agreement resulting from 
the exercise of duress may be entirely consistent with the law, however, the 
courts will, in appropriate circumstances, examine the way in which such 
agreements are brought about. Even in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
at the height of the philosophy of laissez-faire, the law would interfere where 
duress could be shown. However, as will be seen below, the concept of duress 
was, at that time, substantially more restricted than is the case today. 
The application of the doctrine of duress has extended far beyond its 
origins in threats to the person and to property. If duress is to remain an 
effective and responsive doctrine it is essential that its expansion be based on a 
coherent and consistent conceptual basis. A principled approach must be taken 
in the development of duress. This paper identifies the past and current judicial 
approaches to the doctrine of duress and attempts to establish the most 
appropriate basis on which to develop the concept of economic duress. The 
concept of illegitimacy of pressure is identified as the key to establishing a 
workable doctrine of economic duress and a comprehensive test for illegitimacy 
is proposed. 
II THE CONCEPT OF DURESS 
A The Justification for Relief 
It is overly simplistic to say that relief is justified in cases of duress 
because the weaker party has been pressured to act in some way. Pressures of 
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various sorts and weights are constantly driving the way in which we act. We 
accept many types of pressure as ordinary incidents of everyday life: 1 
[I]n life, including the life of commerce and in finance, many acts are done 'under 
pressure, sometimes overwhelming pressure'; but they are not necessarily done under 
duress. That depends on whether the circumstances are such that the law regards the 
pressure as legitimate. 
There exist, however, certain pressures which the courts see as 
justifying relief for those exposed to them. That the relief provided where 
duress is established is the recovery of money paid or the setting aside of a 
contract is a clear indication that the principal aims of duress are to protect the 
victim and to prevent the oppressor from gaining from his or her actions. 
Retribution or punishment of the coercer is not an aim of the doctrine of duress. 
A remedy is provided to give effect to the victim's rights, principally the right to 
freedom of choice. This right to freedom of choice is not, however, an 
unlimited freedom. It is limited by the moral and legal constraints imposed by 
society. The particular freedom that the doctrine of duress guarantees is the 
freedom to choose free of certain pressures that the law does not countenance. 
Seddon2 suggests that this concern for the rights of the victim can be justified in 
a number of ways. Morally, the dignity of the individual dictates that this 
freedom be protected. So too politically, where the very concept of democracy 
demands it, and economically, where, it is argued, wealth is maximised in a 
market where both buyers and sellers are able to exercise choice without undue 
coercion. These justifications may seem to suggest that relief should be 
provided in response to any pressure. Freedom, however, "must be limited in 
order to be possessed" .3 
Seddon provides another possible justification for the provision of relief 
in response to unacceptable pressure by viewing such pressure as a breach of the 
social contract. Part of the social contract involves the surrender of total 
freedom in return for guarantees of a more limited freedom. Thus individuals 
surrender the right to coerce in exchange for freedom from the coercion of 
2 
Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers' Federation 
(1982] AC 366, 560-561 per Lord Scarman. 
N Seddon "Compulsion in Commercial Dealings" in PD Finn (ed) Essays on 
Restitution (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1990) 138. 
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others. However, at least in societies based on the free market system, not all 
rights of coercion are surrendered. For example, as Stewart points out, "the free 
market system, and the economic individualism which still nominally underlies 
it, basically assume the existence of, and submission to, commercial pressure. "4 
In almost every commercial transaction one party is in a superior bargaining 
position to the other. A capitalist society allows its members to utilise such 
strength in certain ways to secure commercial advantages. 
The line between acceptable and unacceptable forms of coercion is drawn 
primarily in response to the social and moral attitudes of society. Thus while 
originally only coercion based on threats to the person grounded relief under the 
doctrine of duress, the prohibited forms of coercion have now expanded. Today 
we are entitled to be free of many more forms of coercion and correspondingly 
we are denied the right to utilise them ourselves. 
Ultimately, however, these justifications for the granting of relief must 
be balanced against the competing interests for non-intervention. This balancing 
is particularly in evidence in the case of economic duress. Application of the 
doctrine of economic duress must be tempered by the need for commercial 
certainty and by the doctrine of freedom of contract. 
B The Nature of Relief 
The nature of the relief available where duress has been established 
depends largely upon the advantage secured for the stronger party by the 
exercise of duress. Where that advantage is the payment of money, the 
restitutionary remedy of an action for money had and received is available to the 
victim.5 Where the duress has resulted in the entry into a contract, that contract 
is regarded as being voidable at the instance of the victim. 6 Where a person 
performs services under duress a claim for quantum meruit will be available to 
the victim allowing him or her to recover reasonable remuneration for those 
4 
5 
6 
A Stewart "Economic Duress - Legal Regulation of Commercial Pressure" (1984) 
Melbourne University Law Review 410, 422. 
Astley v Reynolds (1731) 2 Strange 915; 93 ER 939 (KB); Maskell v Horner [1915] 
3 KB 106; See also Lord Diplock's comments in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia 
v International Transport Workers' Federation above n 1, 385, wbicb, while relating 
to economic duress are of wider application. 
North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd (The Atlantic Baron) 
f19791 OB 70.'i. 719: Pao On v Lau Yiu LonP f1980l AC 614. 634. 636: Universe 
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services. 7 The transfer of goods under duress can be remedied by a claim for 
quantum valebat. 
Non-restitutionary remedies will continue to be available to the victim 
where the duress itself constitutes a tort or a breach of contract. Thus, in such 
circumstances, ordinary principles of tort and contract will apply. 
In addition, the exercise of duress may constitute a breach of section 23 
of the Fair Trading 1986 which provides that: 
No person shall use physical force or harassment or coercion in connection with the 
supply or possible supply of goods or services or the payment of goods or services. 
Where this is the case the Fair Trading Act 1986 provides a wide range of orders 
that a court may make on the application of the victim. These orders can 
include:8 
• an injunction; 
• a declaration that the contract is void; 
• a vaiiation of the contract; 
• requiring the coercer to refund money or return property to the 
victim; 
• requiring the coercer to pay to the victim the amount of any 
loss. 
Thus there are potentially a number of avenues of relief, both restitutionary and 
non-restitutionary, available to the victim of duress. 
C Denial of Relief 
There will be occasions when, despite the existence of operative duress, 
relief will be denied to the victim. 
7 Lord Goff and G Jones The Law of Restitution (3ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
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1 Causation 
Relief will only be justified where there exists a causal link between the 
pressure that has been exerted and the victim's subsequent action. It was made 
clear by the Privy Council in Barton v Armstrong9 that the pressure need not be 
the sole motivating force so long as it is a cause of the victim's action. Thus, in 
that case, relief was granted to the plaintiff despite there having been sound 
business reasons for his actions. The Court was satisfied that the threats to the 
plaintiff's safety had been a factor in his decision to do as the defendant 
demanded. Lord Goff took a somewhat different view of the causation 
requirement in respect of economic duress in Dimskal Shipping Co v 
International Transport Workers' Federation (The "Evia Luck").10 Lord Goff 
considered that the pressure must have constituted a "significant cause inducing 
the plaintiff to enter into the relevant contract. "11 However, Lord Goff cites in 
support of this statement the cases of Barton v Armstrong12 and Crescendo 
Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation 13 both of which clearly 
state that the pressure need only be "one of the reasons for the person entering 
into the agreement" .14 Regardless, where it can be shown that the victim would 
have acted in the same manner in the absence of duress, this will provide a 
defence to the coercer and the victim will have no restitutionary remedy. The 
onus here is on the coercer to prove that the pressure had no effect. 15 
2 Affirmation 
Restitutionary relief will also be denied where the victim can be taken to 
have subsequently affirmed the contract entered into or the payment made under 
duress. Because a contract entered into under duress is voidable and not void, 
such a contract may be affirmed by the victim. Affirmation may be by way of a 
positive act on the part of the victim but equally it would appear that delay in 
seeking a remedy may constitute affirmation. In North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd 
v Hyundai Construction Co Ltd (The Atlantic Baron)16 while there was found to 
9 [1976] AC 104, 118-119. 
1 O [1992] AC 152. 
11 Above n 10, 165. 
12 Aboven9. 
13 (1988) 19 NSWLR 40. 
14 Above n 13, 46. 
15 Barton v AnnstronJ?, above n 9; Cresendo ManaJ?ement Ptv Ltd v Westpac BankinJ? 
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be duress on the facts, relief was denied due to the absence of protest on the part 
of the victim once the pressure was no longer operative and the eight month 
delay between the release of the pressure and the bringing of a claim by the 
victim. 
That any action taken while under the effect of duress may be affirmed 
by lapse of time after the duress has ceased to operate is consistent with the 
position in respect of undue influence. There are a number of cases of undue 
influence in which relief has been denied as a result of delay in seeking to set 
aside the relevant transaction. 17 Affirmation requires a "fixed, deliberate and 
unbiased determination not to impeach the transaction" 18 and the courts have 
been prepared to accept that delays of several years will provide a basis from 
which to infer such a determination. While the delay in The Atlantic Baron was 
only eight months, arguably, in a commercial context this is sufficient to 
establish affirmation. The need for commercial certainty demands that parties 
can rely on the validity of the contracts they have made. If large commercial 
contracts could be set aside eight months after the pressure inducing them had 
ceased and when there had been no indication given to the dominant party that 
the victim had entered the contract under duress, commerce in general would be 
adversely affected. Commercial parties could not rely on the validity of their 
transactions which would increase the perceived risks in transacting making 
parties less willing to commit to transactions. 
Certainly where it could be said that the coercer was aware of the duress 
and its effect a court will be far less likely to find affirmation in silence. Thus in 
Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd19 a one month delay 
in seeking relief was not even argued by counsel to amount to affirmation. In 
that case not only was the delay relatively short and over the Christmas holiday 
period, but when the threat had been made by Atlas Express Ltd ("Atlas"), it had 
deliberately made itself unavailable to discuss the situation. The actions of Atlas 
demonstrate that it was well aware that Kafco (Importers and Exporters) Ltd 
("Kafco") were entering the contract unwillingly. 
17 
18 
Wright v Vanderplank (1856) 8 De GM & G 133; 44 ER 340 (action commenced 10 
years after the gift was made); Turner v Collins (1871) 7 Ch App 329 (action 
commenced seven years after the benefit was conferred); Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 
Ch D 145 (no attempt to recover property until six years after the undue influence had 
ceased). 
M Cope Duress, Undue Influence and Unconsionable Bar>?ains (The Law Book 
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3 Third parties 
Further difficulties in obtaining relief can arise where the duress has 
resulted in the conferment of a benefit on a third party who is without notice of 
the duress. 20 Although the third party will have been enriched at the victim's 
expense, restitution may not be possible where the third party can establish a 
defence such as change of position.21 Similarly, relief will be denied against the 
bona fide purchaser for value without notice.22 These principles are well 
established in the context of undue influence and are equally applicable in the 
case of duress.23 In such a case the victim must look to other than restitutionary 
remedies. Where the coercion has occurred "in trade" the seeking of an order 
under section 43 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 that the coercer pay to the victim 
the amount of any loss would seem to be a particularly appropriate avenue of 
relief in such circumstances. 
III EARLY FORMS OF DURESS 
A Duress of the Person 
In its original form, duress at common law extended only to threats of 
violence against a person. Relief was further limited by the requirement that the 
threat had to be to the life, the loss of a limb, or to the imprisonment of the party 
or his or her family. 24 Early authorities also required that the threat be one 
which would have coerced the "constant man".25 This objective test meant that 
there was little room for relief for those of less than average robustness. 
Today duress of the person is wider in its scope. A greater range of 
threats are seen to be within its ambit and the "constant man" has been replaced 
by a subjective test which focuses on the effect of the pressure on the coerced 
party. This broadening of the scope of duress of the person came about from 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
The U1ird party who has notice of the duress can be in no better position than the 
person who exercises the duress (see Goff and Jones, above n 7, 230 at n 9). 
Lipkin Gorman (A Firm) v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548; Goff and Jones, above n 
7, 231. 
Cope, above n 18, 223. 
Cope, above n 18, 222. 
DW Greig and JLR Davis The Law of Contract (The Law Book Company Ltd, 
Sydney, 1987) 942. 
See PD Maddau!!h and .ID McCamus The Law of Restitution (Canadian Law Book 
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the fusion of law and equity in the mid-1870's. Prior to this, while common 
law duress had restricted itself to dealing with threats to life, health, liberty or 
physical comfo1t, equity encompassed a broader concept of coercion or duress. 
Equity offered protection from the effects of threats by a stronger party where 
such threats had affected the judgment of the weaker party:26 
It was considered to be equitable fraud for the stronger party to retain the advantage of 
a contract which he had extorted from one unable to protect himself by reason of the 
pressure brought to bear on him. 
Since fusion it is arguable that equitable and common law duress have 
become indistinguishable. Support for this view can be found in the case of 
Barton v Armstrong.27 In that case the Privy Council were prepared to consider 
both common law and equity cases in coming to their conclusion:28 
Their Lordships do not think that the common law authorities are of any real 
assistance.... On the other hand they think that the conclusion to which Jacobs JA 
[in the Cowt below] came was right and that is supported by the equity decisions. 
Greig and Davis argue that this could only be justified on the basis that the two 
forms of duress had become identical.29 
This increasing breadth of application meant that moral pressure could 
ground a claim of duress. In Kaufman v Gerson30 the English Court of Appeal 
held that duress was established where the plaintiff had threatened a wife "with 
the dishonour of her husband and children". The plaintiff had threatened to 
bring criminal charges against the defendant's husband unless the defendant 
agreed to pay the money misappropriated by her husband. The Court was of the 
opinion that, had she not complied, the proceedings "would probably have 
resulted in the ruin of the husband, and the disgrace of his wife and children. "31 
The Court saw no difference in principle between coercion based upon threats to 
health and liberty and coercion by moral pressure. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Greig and Davis, above n 24, 942. 
[1973) 2 NSWLR 598; appealed to the Privy Council, above n 9. 
Above n 9, 118. 
Above n 24, 943. 
ECONOMIC DURESS BY THREATENED BREACH OF CONTRACT 9 
The move away from the "constant man" requirement toward a 
subjective test added further flexibility to the application of duress of the person. 
It also reflected a greater concern for the rights and freedoms of individuals by 
providing recognition that a person is no less coerced simply because a more 
robust person might have better weathered the pressure that was applied. This 
rejection of a purely objective test is to be welcomed in respect of duress to the 
person and duress of goods where threats are directed at fundamental rights. 
However, the subjective approach is not as appropriate in the case of economic 
duress where the rights attacked are not of such a fundamental nature. The 
requirement of no reasonable alternative in the doctrine of economic duress 
provides an objective element to the inquiry. Where a reasonable alternative 
exists economic duress will not be established.32 
B Duress of Goods 
Duress of goods involves threats directed against the property of the 
victim in order to coerce him or her into acting in a particular manner. The 
archetypical case is of a demand for payment (or for the agreement to pay) 
money to avoid the seizure of goods or to secure the release of goods unlawfully 
seized. It was suggested by Kerr J in Occidental Worldwide Investment 
Corporation v Skibs A/S Avanti (The Siboen and The Sibotre)33 that duress of 
goods could extend to threats to bum down a house or to slash a painting. 
Previously, a peculiar distinction was drawn between the payment of 
money under duress of goods and the entering into a contract in the same 
circumstances. It has long been established that money paid under duress of 
goods is recoverable. 34 However, until recently, it was thought that a promise 
to pay, supported by fresh consideration, extracted under duress of goods was 
binding.35 This distinction has been swept away by modem cases and today a 
contract obtained under duress of goods is, as under other forms of duress, 
voidable. 36 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See below Part VI. 
[1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep 293, 335. 
Astley v Reynolds, above n 5. 
Skeate v Beale (1841) 11 AD & E 983; 113 ER 688 (KB). 
See The Siboen and The Sibotre, above n 33, 335-336; North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd 
v Hvundai Construction Co Ltd (The Atlantic Baron). ahove n 6: Universe Tankshins 
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A recent example of the rejection of this distinction can be found in 
Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter Charter Pty Ltd. 37 Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd 
("Hawker") had agreed to repaint a helicopter owned by Helicopter Charter Pty 
Ltd ("HC"). On completion of the repainting HC were not satisfied with the 
quality of the work done and Hawker eventually agreed to rectify the problems 
at their own expense. However, once the work had been satisfactorily 
completed Hawker refused to release the helicopter to HC until HC had signed a 
document agreeing to pay Hawker a sum of money and releasing Hawker from 
any liability in respect of the paint job. Hawker were aware at the time that HC 
required the helicopter immediately for charter work. 
The New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the agreement to pay 
and the release of liability were obtained under duress and as such were liable to 
be set aside. Clarke JA said of the distinction between money paid under duress 
and agreements to pay obtained in the same circumstances:38 
This distinction, if correct, leads to the absurd result that if A paid money under duress 
of goods he could recover the money paid but if he entered into a contract to pay 
money under similar duress he could not avoid the contract and would be obliged to 
pay the moneys due thereunder. 
In my opinion the distinction is not supportable and to the extent that Skeate is 
authority for the so-called traditional view it should not be followed. 
Similarly, in terms of a restitutionary analysis this distinction cannot be 
supported. Whether there is a payment made under duress or an agreement to 
pay, the coercer will be unjustly (by the use of duress) enriched at the victim's 
expense. 39 Enrichment is present whether the obligation is executory or 
executed. 
In addition, even in the case of a payment of money there will often have 
been, between demand and payment, a scintilla temporis where there existed an 
agreement to pay the sum. With the benefit of hindsight it seems strange that it 
took 150 years for the law to rid itself of this bizarre distinction. 
37 (1991) 22 NSWLR 298. 
38 Above n 37, 306. 
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IV AN APPROPRIATE BASIS FOR ECONOMIC DURESS 
A The Two Approaches 
Traditionally the rationale for the application of duress was that the 
coerced party's will was "overborne", that there was no true consent or 
agreement.40 This theory was approved by the Privy Council in Pao On v La,u 
Yiu Long41 where Lord Scarman stated it in these terms:42 
Duress, whatever form it takes, is a coercion of the will so as to vitiate consent.. .. It 
must be shown that the payment made or the contract entered into was not a voluntary 
act. 
However, the overborne will theory has been criticised by academics as 
being logically indefensible and, in practice, impossible to implement.43 As 
Atiyah points out, "[a] victim of duress does normally know what he is doing, 
does choose to submit, and does intend to do so. "44 The victim's will is not 
"overborne", there exists a very real intention to act in that manner. On one 
view, the more extreme the pressure, the more real the consent.45 
Further, the overborne will theory was impossible to reconcile with the 
fact that duress renders a contract voidable and not void.46 If there really were 
no true consent then, logically, any resulting "agreement" must be void ab initio. 
This academic criticism was eventually taken on board by the judiciary 
and modern cases in the United Kingdom and Australia appear to have left 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
PS Atiyah "Economic Duress and the 'Overborne Will Theory'" (1982) 98 Law 
Quarterly Review 197, 198. 
Above n 6. 
Above n 6, 635-636. 
PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979) 
436. The overbom11e will theory of duress was rejected by the House of Lords in the 
context of the criminal law in the case of Lynch v DPP of Northern Ireland [1975] 
AC 653. 
Atiyah, above n 40, 200. 
JP Dawson "Economic Duress - An Essay in Perspective" (1947) 45 Mich LR 253, 
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behind the overborne will theory:47 
In my opinion the overbearing of the will theory of duress should be rejected. A 
person who is the subject of duress usually knows only too well what be is doing. 
But he chooses to submit to the demand or pressure rather than take an alternative 
course of act.ion. The proper approach in my opinion is to ask whether any applied 
pressure induced the victim to enter into the contract and then ask whether that 
pressure went beyond what the law is prepared to countenance as legitimate? 
This followed the decision of the House of Lords in Universe Tankships Inc of 
Monrovia v International Transport Workers' Federation48 in which Lord 
Scarman, without directly acknowledging the fact, effectively discarded the 
overborne will theory. In that case Lord Scarman built on his earlier formulation 
of the test in Pao On stating that:49 
The authorities upon which these two cases [Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104 and 
Pao On] were based reveal two elements of the wrong of duress: (1) pressure 
amounting to compulsion of the will of the victim; and (2) the illegitimacy of the 
pressure exerted. There must be pressure, the practical effect of which is compulsion 
or the absence of choice. Compulsion is variously described in the authorities as 
coercion or tJ1e vitiation of consent. The classic case of duress is, however, not the 
lack of will to submit but the victim's intentional submission arising from the 
realisation tJrnt there is no practical choice open to him. This is the thread of 
principle which links the early law of duress (threat to life or limb) with later 
developments .... 
Thus the focus of the duress inquiry in Lord Scarman's view was not on 
establishing an involuntary act, but rather on identifying an intentional 
submission to illegitimate pressure. 
B 
47 
The Difference Between the Approaches 
Cresendo Management Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corp, above n 13, 45-46. See 
also Lord Gaffs comments in Dimskal Shipping Co v International Transport 
Workers' Federation, above n 10, 166. 
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Although expressed in very different terms these approaches may not be 
so different in application. Two aspects of the approaches must be considered: 
the effect of the pressure and the form of the pressure. 
1 Ihe effect of the pressure 
In terms of the practical effect of the pressure it would appear that they 
describe the same requirement. In Pao On the Privy Council detailed the 
material factors in determining whether a person's will is overborne for the 
purposes of the duress inquiry:50 
In determining whether there was a coercion of will such that there was no true 
consent, it is material to inquire whether the person alleged to have been coerced did or 
did not protest; whether, at the time he was allegedly coerced into making the 
contract, he did or did not have an alternative course open to him such as an adequate 
legal remedy; whether he was independently advised; and whether after entering the 
contract he took steps to avoid it. All these matters are, as was recognised in Maskell 
v Horner (1915] 3 K.B. 106, relevant in determining whether he acted voluntarily or 
not. 
Under the test enunciated by Lord Scarman in Universe Tank.ships the 
effect that the pressure must have on the victim was described by him as 
"compulsion of the will" which he went on to define as intentional submission in 
the absence of practical choice. The factors relevant in determining this absence 
of practical choice were set out by Lord Scarman:51 
[T]he absence of choice can be proved in various ways, e.g. by protest, by the absence 
of independent advice, or by a declaration to go to law to recover the money paid or 
the property transferred: see Maskell v Horner (1915] 3 K.B. 106. But none of these 
evidential matters goes to the essence of duress. The victim's silence will not assist 
the bully, if the lack of any practicable choice but to submit is proved. 
Thus the two approaches apply the same criteria in examining the effect 
of the pressure on the victim .52 So while the overborne will theory suggests 
50 Above n 6, 635. 
51 Above n 1, 400. 
5 2 See M Trehilcock "An Economic Annroach to lJnconscionahilitv" in B .T Reiter and .T 
1 •• •v UBfV,RY 
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the need for automatism on the part of the victim before duress is established, in 
practice the requirement is far less extreme. The language of the overborne will 
theory is inconsistent with its application. This is illustrated by Chandler's53 
rationalisation of the overborne will theory. Chandler views the term "vitiation 
of consent" as denoting "involuntary intent".54 That is, that "the party's actions 
are intentional but with a countervailing desire that the ensuing consequences are 
nullified. "55 Chandler goes on to state that:56 
Perhaps the true hallmark of coercion is the lack of voluntary action by the weaker 
party. The word "voluntary" infers, at the very least, the absence of effective choice: 
the choice to pursue a legal remedy, the choice of not submitting, the choice to do 
something different. It is the unavoidable and serious consequences of non-
submission which lies at the heart of coercion. 
Similarly, in the United States, Williston57 notes the tendency of courts 
to use terms such as "involuntary" and "lack of free will" but states that these 
terms do not mean "no choice", rather they illustrate compulsion to choose 
between "regrettable alternatives". As the Supreme Court of Ohio held in 
Tallmadge v Robinson, 58 "[t]he real and ultimate fact to be determined in every 
case is whether the party affected really had a choice; whether he had his 
freedom of exercising his will." 
The fact that the two tests overlap in terms of the required effect on the 
victim can be illustrated by the case of Pao On itself. In Pao On the Privy 
Council were required to consider a complex commercial transaction in which 
the plaintiffs claimed to have been forced to make a promise by threats to break 
an existing contractual agreement. The plaintiffs had entered an agreement of 
sale and purchase with Fu Chip Investment Co Ltd ("Fu Chip"), whose shares 
were owned predominantly by the defendants, in respect of the plaintiffs' shares 
in Tsuen Wan Shing On Co Ltd ("Shing On"). The payment for these shares 
was to be by way of shares in Fu Chip. The defendants were concerned that the 
so-called duress cases is whether the conduct of the party against whom the doctrine is 
pleaded was such as to remove from, or take advantage of, effective access by the other 
party to a workably competitive range of alternative choices." 
53 PA Chandler "Economic Duress: Clarity or Confusion?" [1990] Lloyd's Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 270. 
54 Above n 53, 274. 
55 Above n 53, 274-275. 
5 6 Above n 53, 275. 
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plaintiffs might dispose of the Fu Chip shares too quickly thereby adversely 
affecting the value of Fu Chip's shares in general. In order to avoid this, the 
plaintiffs agreed to retain 60% of the shares for a year in return for a guarantee 
from the defendants that they would then purchase the shares at a set price (the 
subsidiary agreement). The Fu Chip shares were expected to rise in value and 
the plaintiffs realised that they had made a bad bargain. As such, the plaintiffs 
told the defendants that, unless the guarantee was varied to one of indemnity, the 
plaintiff would not complete the main contract for the transfer of the Shing On 
shares. The defendants agreed to the change due to the fear that news of a 
problem with the main contract would affect public confidence in Fu Chip. The 
value of the shares in fact fell and, when the plaintiffs sought to rely on the 
contract of indemnity, the defendants argued that it was voidable for economic 
duress. 59 
The Privy Council held that economic duress was not established in this 
case. Although the Privy Council based their decision on the overborne will 
theory, the question of the existence of alternatives was considered an important 
evidential factor and, in fact, appears to have formed the basis of their 
decision:60 
In the present case there is unanimity amongst the judges below that there was no 
coercion of the first defendant's will. In the Court of Appeal the trial judge's 
findings ... tlrnt the first defendant considered the matter thoroughly, chose to avoid 
litigation, and formed the opinion that the risk in giving the guarantee was more 
apparent than real was upheld. 
The defendants had a reasonable alternative available to them. They 
knew that the main agreement between Fu Chip and the plaintiffs was still valid 
and that Fu Chip could have sued the defendants for specific performance or 
damages. Further, the trial Judge found that the success or failure of the main 
contract could not have affected the true value of Fu Chip's shares. As such the 
defendant had a real option of exercising a legal remedy. The available 
alternative "was not one which the fact situation rendered largely useless in 
5 9 The plaintiffs could not rely on the subsidiary agreement as it bad been cancelled when 
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practical terms. "61 Clearly the decision that there was no duress would be the 
same applying the test from Universe Tankships. 
2 The form of the pressure 
Thus the main difference between the two approaches to duress is the 
express requirement in the modem formulation that the pressure exerted be of a 
type that the law considers illegitimate. However, in Universe Tankships, Lord 
Scarman made it clear that this requirement was present in the earlier authority. 
His Lordship stated that "[t]he authorities ... reveal two elements of the wrong of 
duress" ,62 the second of these elements Lord Scarman identified as illegitimacy 
of pressure. 
That the law has long distinguished between different types of pressures 
is clearly illustrated by early restrictions on the types of threats that would 
ground a claim of duress. Initially duress was restricted to threats to the person. 
Subsequently threats to property were recognised as grounding claims in duress. 
Thus duress operated only in respect of certain pressures and there were some 
pressures that the law would not recognise as justifying relief. For example, in 
Smith v William Charlick Ltd63 a threat not to contract in future was held not to 
give rise to duress despite the fact that the effect of the pressure on the victim 
would clearly have satisfied the overborne will theory had the threat been of a 
type the law recognised as grounding a claim of duress.64 As Isaacs J stated: 
3 
61 
62 
63 
64 
[I]t is plain that a mere abstention from selling goods to a man except on condition of 
his making a stated payment cannot, in the absence of some special relation, answer 
the description of "compulsion," however serious his situation arising from other 
circumstances may be .... 
Summary 
E MacDonald "Duress by Threatened Breach of Contract" [1989] Journal of Business 
Law 460, 466. 
Above 1, 400. 
(1924) 34 CLR 38. 
The Wheat 1 IarvesL Board had threatened not to do further business with a the victim 
unless he naid additional fees to U1e Board. The situation would clearlv have bad the 
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The fact that the two approaches are substantially the same in application 
may seem to suggest that this is merely a terminological and theoretical debate, 
however, it has very important practical implications. There is something far 
more important at stake here than the designation of the test. The concept of 
overborne will stands as a conceptual bar to establishing coherent and consistent 
principles in the application and development of the doctrine of duress. The 
overborne will theory is entirely adequate for dealing with established categories 
of duress where the types of threats that are prohibited have long been 
established and are directed at protection of fundamental rights. However, as 
Atiyah points out, there is a need when expanding the doctrine beyond its base 
in threats to the person and threats to goods to examine the vital issue of "what 
sort of threats is it permissible to make .... "65 
Expanding the doctrine of duress to economic pressure on the basis of 
the overborne will theory makes the assumption that any economic pressure will 
potentially ground a claim for duress and all that must be shown is that the 
pressure had the required effect on the victim. However, in reality, there are 
pressures, sometimes overwhelming pressures, that we are prepared to 
countenance as acceptable. 66 As Stewart states:67 
To allow business decisions to be reopened on the ground alone that 'overbearing' 
pressure, of whatever nature, had been exerted would be to defeat the very notion of a 
free market and the 'freedom to coerce' (within limits) which it presupposes .... To 
invalidate a commercial contract or payment merely because one party was 'forced' to 
do something would be absurd: if something further is required it must surely come 
from an examination of the type of pressure exerted. 
Some forms of economic coercion are legally and commercially acceptable and a 
responsive doctrine of duress must recognise this fact. 
A further practical reason for rejecting the overborne will theory is the 
possibility that the often stated requirement that there be an involuntary act will 
be adopted literally "by those whose business it is to apply the law. "68 Such a 
65 
66 
67 
Above n 40, 202. 
Universe Tankships, above n 1, 560-561. 
A Stewart "Economic Duress - Legal Regulation of Commercial Pressure" (1984) 14 
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literal interpretation of the test would result in the usefulness of duress as a 
means of regulating coercive pressure being dramatically reduced. 
C The New Zealand Position 
In New Zealand the modern formulation of the test focused on the 
illegitimacy of the pressure exerted has not found favour. The Court of Appeal 
appear to be indifferent to overseas developments and cling to the concepts of 
overborne will and lack of voluntary act. As recently as May 1995 the Court of 
Appeal could confidently assert that, to demonstrate that pressure brought to 
bear amounted to economic duress:69 
[i]t would have to be shown that his [lhe victim's] will had been so coerced lhat his 
consent to it was completely vitiated and so was not a voluntary act: Pao On v Lau 
Yiu Long [1980] AC 614 and Moyes & Groves Ltd v Radiation New 
Zealand Ltd [1982] 1 NZLR 368. 
Similarly in Mann v Buxton10 the Court of Appeal were of the view that 
"coercion or the overbearing of the defendant's will must be at the foundation of 
any claim to avoid a contract for duress." The more recent Commonwealth 
cases on economic duress were not even cited by the Court in either of these 
cases. 
In the High Court there has been some recogmt10n of overseas 
developments. In Walmsley v Christchurch City Council,1 1 Hardie Boys J 
applied an amalgam of the two approaches. He held that in order to establish 
duress it must be shown that illegitimate pressure was exerted on the victim 
which "amounted to a coercion of the will, so that the contract was not a 
voluntary act on the part of the party under pressure. "72 A similar amalgamation 
of the two tests can be seen in the judgment of Tipping J in Shivas v Bank of 
69 Rouse v Anzon Project No 5 Ltd (unreported, 30 May 1995, Court of Appeal, CA 
211-90). 
7 0 Unreported, 31 July 1990, Court of Appeal, CP 49/90. 
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New Zealand:73 
Unless the party seeking to avoid the contract establishes that his will has been 
compelled to such an extent as to vitiate his consent, then the question of the 
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the pressure will not arise. Assuming however that this 
first hurdle is jumped, the party seeking to avoid the contract must show that his will 
has been overborne by illegitimate commercial pressure. 
Some High Court decisions appear to be more progressive and have 
adopted overseas developments. In Foster v Phillips74 Master Hansen held 
that:75 
The first thing to consider is whether or not at the time the Defendant entered into the 
settlement and the mortgage, the pressure imposed by the Plaintiff was such as to 
leave no alternative. 
Having dealt with this issue the Master went on to consider whether: 76 
... the pressure imposed by the Plaintiffs [was] illegitimate in the sense that both the 
nature of t11e pressure and t11e demands made of the defendant were such that the law 
should not regru·d tJ1e pressure as legitimate .... 
However, it seems clear that the law as it stands in New Zealand 
continues to frame the duress inquiry in terms of the overborne will theory 
enunciated by the Privy Council in Pao On. This is consistent with the doctrine 
of stare decisis. In Breuer v Wright77 the Court of Appeal held that it is bound 
by Privy Council decisions from other jurisdictions. However, it is clear from 
the foregoing discussion 78 that to cast aside the overborne will theory would not 
be so much a rejection of the Privy Council's decision in Pao On as a 
clarification of the trne principles underlying the decision. 
V 
73 
74 
75 
76 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC DURESS 
[1990] 2 NZLR 327, 345. 
Unreported, 5 September 1990, High Court Auckland Registry, CP 2845/89. 
Above n 74, 
Above n 74, 
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Economic duress is the exercise of illegitimate economic pressure to 
force another person to submit to a demand. It is in the arena of economic 
duress that the line between legitimate and illegitimate pressure is most difficult 
to draw. While threats to the person or to property clearly breach community 
standards and seek to deny individual rights and freedoms, the threats involved 
in economic duress are more subtle and thus can be difficult to characterise as 
illegitimate. As Greig and Davis point out:79 
With regard to duress to the person, the threat of injury or imprisonment is regarded, 
of itself, as unconscionable.... Life and liberty are so highly prized that the law seeks 
to discourage the use of such threats to obtain the benefits of a contract 
The law has a similarly protective attitude toward personal property 
rights. However in respect of economic interests the law adopts a far less 
paternal role. Our economy is based largely on competition. Commercial 
pressure is a part of every day life and must remain so for our economy to 
flourish. Thus the law accepts that the exercise of economic pressure can be 
legitimate. As Lord Diplock put it in Universe Tankships, "[c]ommercial 
pressure, in some degree, exists wherever one party to a commercial transaction 
is in a stronger bargaining position than the other. "80 
Recognition of economic duress as a basis for relief has come only 
recently to English law. The first English case to recognise the possibility that 
economic threats may give rise to relief on the ground of duress was the 1976 
case of The Siboen and The Sibotre. 81 Three years later in North Ocean 
Shipping82 Mocatta J built on this recognition and drew on a line of Australian 
cases83 as the basis of economic duress. Today, while debate rages as to the 
scope of the doctrine, it is clear that economic duress is very much a part of our 
law. 
The late development of economic duress in English law can be 
attributed in part to the lingering effect the laisez faire principles of an earlier 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Above n 24, 949. 
Above n 1, 384. 
Above n 33. 
Above n 6. 
Smith v William Charlick Ltd (1924) 34 CLR 38: Nixon v Fumhv (1925) 25 SR 
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time. The existence of the pre-existing duty rule also did much to stunt the 
development of the doctrine of economic duress. The pre-existing duty rule 
provides that the performance, or promise of performance of a pre-existing 
contractual obligation owed to the promisee will not constitute good 
consideration. 84 The basis of this rule was considered by Mahon J in Cook 
Islands Shipping v Colson85 to be: 
... the requirement of legal policy that one contracting party should not be subject to 
an extorted demand for further payment under threat of non-performance, especially 
where due performance is of special importance to that party .... 
Thus the pre-existing duty rule was seen to perform a function that is viewed 
today as more appropriately dealt with by the doctrine of economic duress. As 
such there was no perceived need to establish another rule to achieve the same 
ends. 
In recent years, however, the pre-existing duty rule has fallen from 
favour. It is now considered unsatisfactory as a tool for protecting against the 
use of illegitimate economic pressure. It is an absolute rule of general 
application and as such is a blunt and unwieldy instrument too inflexible to deal 
with all the situations to which it is applicable. It applies regardless of whether 
duress is present or not and thus will strike down what might be completely 
reasonable and fair commercial bargains. The rule is far broader than the 
justification given by Mahon J would suggest. 
In addition, the rule is contrary to commonsense as it can be easily 
avoided by the provision of nominal consideration. Thus bargains extorted in 
circumstances where the justification of the rule demands its operation can be 
taken outside its scope by the provision of a peppercorn or some other spurious 
consideration. 
A further failing of the rule is that, as a consequence of a finding of no 
consideration, any contract agreed between the parties that fails the pre-existing 
duty test must be void ab initio. This deprives the courts of the more flexible 
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remedies available under economic duress where such a contract is considered 
voidable. 86 
VI ECONOMIC DURESS AND THE ROLE OF REASONABLE 
ALTERNATIVES 
There is some confusion amongst commentators and some judges as to 
whether the requirement that the victim have no reasonable choice is an element 
of the illegitimacy inquiry as Hall and Seddon87 suggest or, as MacDonald 
assumes, 88 a separate requirement in the establishment of duress. On the basis 
of Lord Goff s comment in The Evia Luck89 that the pressure must be a 
"significant cause" it is at least arguable that the existence of alternatives is an 
issue of causation.90 
However, when Lord Scarman's modem formulation of the test for 
duress is considered it becomes clear that the correct view of the alternatives test 
is that it is an independent and essential element in establishing economic duress. 
Lord Scarman clearly separates it from the issue of illegitimacy regarding the 
two as independent limbs of the duress inquiry. This approach has been 
adopted in New Zealand High Court in Foster v Phillips91 and in Echo 
Investments Ltd v Sheffield.92 
The same distinction is made in the United States where the Restatement 
of Contracts provides that duress exists where:93 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
... a party's manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party 
that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative .... 
Greig and Davis, above n 24, 951. 
"Duress" in JA Riordan (ed) The Laws of Australia (The Law Book Company, 
Sydney, 1993) Chpt 35.7, 14. 
Above n 61, 466. 
Above n 10, 165. 
Where the victim has one or more reasonable alternatives available to him or her then 
arguably tl1e decision to submit to tl1e demand was not significantly caused by the 
pressure. Otl1er factors must have pushed the victim to submit. It would, of course, 
still be open to the coercer to prove that the victim would have taken the same course 
of action in the absence of the duress. 
Above n 74. 
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Similarly, American case law is clear that what must be shown is wrongful or 
improper pressure and the absence of any reasonable altematives.94 
Thus the alternatives test is clearly a substantive limitation on the 
application of the doctrine of economic duress. As Palmer says:95 
Restitution will be denied where there was an available remedy whereby the plaintiff 
could have prevented the threatened consequences. 
That this is so is clearly illustrated by the decision in Pao On where the existence 
of reasonable alternatives meant that economic duress was not established. As 
Kerr LJ stated in B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications 
Ltd:96 
I also bear in mind that a threat to break a contract unless money is paid by the other 
party can, but by no means always will, constitute duress. It appears from the 
authorities that it will only constitute duress if the consequences of a refusal would be 
serious and immediate so that there is no reasonable alternative open, such as by legal 
redress, obtaining an injunction, etc. 
While Lord Scaiman talked of "practical choice" the alternatives test is 
generally framed in terms of "reasonable choice" .97 Thus the issue of the 
existence of alternatives is clearly an objective inquiry. It is not so important 
whether the victim perceives that he or she has no alternative, rather it is for the 
Court to determine. As part of this determination the courts must look to the 
potential effect of any threat if it were to be carried out. This will give a basis on 
which to judge the reasonableness of any alternatives. The less catastrophic the 
consequences of weathering the pressure, the more reasonable will be the 
available alternatives. 
VII ECONOMIC DURESS AND ILLEGITIMACY OF 
PRESSURE 
94 
95 
96 
See, for example, Gruever v Midas International Corp 925 F 2d 280 (CA 9 (OR) 
1991); Brock v Ent re Computer Centres Inc 933 F 2d 1253 (CA 4 (Va) 1991). 
GE Palmer Law of Restitution (Lillie, Brown and Company (Canada) Ltd, Toronto, 
1978 and 1994 Supplement) 264. 
f}9841 ICR 419, 428. 
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It is not every coercive threat to the economic interests of another that 
will constitute economic duress. The pressure must be of a type that the law 
considers illegitimate. The test for illegitimacy was set out by Lord Scarman in 
Universe Tankships. 98 In determining the legitimacy of the pressure brought to 
bear, one must consider: 
(1) the nature of the pressure; and 
(2) the nature of the demand. 
This formulation of the illegitimacy inquiry has been generally accepted 
by later courts. However, the courts have been less consistent in its application. 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the test formulated by Lord Scarman, in reality 
it merely provides a narrower framework within which to judge illegitimacy 
rather than providing an easy answer to the illegitimacy inquiry. Lord 
Scarman's test defines illegitimacy at a lower level of abstraction than merely 
using the term illegitimacy but it offers few clues as to the factors relevant in its 
application. The case law since Universe Tankships has thrown up a wide range 
of factors seen as relevant in the application of Lord Scarman's test and a 
number of common threads emerge. However, little certainty emerges as to the 
weight to be given to each of the various factors. 
A The Nature of the Pressure 
The nature of the pressure is a product of the threat and the manner in 
which the threat is made. While the nature of the pressure exerted forms the first 
limb of Lord Scarman's test for legitimacy it is clear that it cannot be considered 
in complete isolation from the second limb of the test, the nature of the demand. 
The two limbs are not separate tests, rather they are two parts of the same test 
and they overlap substantially. 
1 Unlawfulness and illegitimacy 
When Lord Scarman formulated his test for illegitimacy he went on to 
state that "the law regards the threat of unlawful action as illegitimate no matter 
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what the demand. "99 The test would indeed be one of simple application if there 
were a direct correlation between unlawfulness and illegitimacy, and between 
lawfulness and legitimacy. However, Lord Scarman's observation of the link 
between illegitimacy and unlawfulness does not tell the whole story. There is 
more to the question of legitimacy of pressure than the legality of the threat. 
This is illustrated by the recognition that lawful threats can give rise to 
illegitimate pressure in certain circumstances.100 
A recent example of such an acknowledgment comes from the English 
Court of Appeal, in CNT Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd. 101 In that case the 
parties disagreed as to who should bear the loss in respect of a stolen 
consignment of cigarettes. The defendant invoiced the plaintiff for the goods. 
Initially the plaintiff rejected the invoice but subsequently paid it after the 
defendant, entirely lawfully, threatened to exercise its discretion to withdraw the 
plaintiffs credit facilities. The plaintiff then brought proceedings to attempt to 
recover the money on the grounds of economic duress. Steyn LJ, with whom 
Farquharson LJ concurred, expressly accepted that "the fact that the defendants 
have used lawful means does not by itself remove the case from the scope of the 
doctrine of economic duress." 102 He then referred to a number of English cases 
in which courts have accepted that threats of lawful action may be illegitimate103 
and cited, with approval, Birks' analysis of the issue: 104 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
Can lawful pressures also count? This is a difficult question, because, if the answer is 
lhat they can, lhe only viable basis for discriminating between acceptable and 
unacceptable pressures is not positive law but social morality. In other words, the 
judges must say what pressures (though lawful outside the restitutionary context) are 
improper as contrary to prevailing standards. That makes judges, not the law or the 
legislature, lhe arbiters of social evaluation. On the other hand, if the answer is that 
lawful pressures are always exempt, lhose who devise outrageous but technically 
lawful means of compulsion must always escape restitution until the legislature 
Universe Tankships, above n 1,401. 
Universe Tankships, above n 1, 401 per Lord Scarman; 
(1994] 4 All ER 714. For a similar acknowledgment, four years earlier, in New 
Zealand, see lhe decision of Tipping J in Shivas v Bank of New Zealand [1990] 2 
NZLR 327, 345. 
Above n 101, 718. 
Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797, 806-807; Mutual Finance Ltd v 
John Welton & Sons Ltd fl9371 2 All ER 657; Universe Tankships, above n 1. 
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declares the abuse unlawful. It is tolerably clear that, at least where they can be 
confident of a general consensus in favour of their evaluation, the courts are willing to 
apply a standard of impropriety rather than technical unlawfulness. 
However, Steyn LJ also recognised that to extend "lawful act duress" to 
the case before him where there was a bona fide claim in a commercial context 
would take the doctrine of economic duress too far: 105 
[I]t seems to me that an extension capable of covering the present case, involving 
'lawful act duress' in a commercial context in pursuit of a bona fide claim, would be a 
radical one with far-reaching implications. It would introduce a substantial and 
undesirable element of uncertainty in the commercial bargaining process. Moreover, 
it will often enable bona fide settled accounts to be reopened when parties to 
commercial dealings fall out. 
Steyn LJ went on to state that while the law ought to encourage fair 
dealing between commercial parties, the courts should not set standards too high 
where the inquiry they are involved in is focused on the moral or social 
acceptability of pressure rather than its lawfulness. 
The acceptance of "lawful act duress" is supported by a number of 
commentators. 106 Once it is realised that the test for illegitimacy focuses on the 
nature of both the pressure and the demand, it is clear that the pressure resulting 
from lawful threats may sometimes constitute illegitimate pressure. The classic 
example of illegitimate pressure based on a lawful threat is blackmail: 107 
Blackmail is often a demand supported by a threat to do what is lawful, e.g. to report 
criminal conduct to the police. In many cases, tl1erefore, "What [one] has to justify is 
not the llueat, but tl1e demand ... " see per Lord Atkin in Thorne v. Motor Trade 
Association [1937) AC 797, 806. 
Baxt has suggested that this decision may be the start of yet another 
erosion of the law of contract. 108 However, the recognition of the English 
105 
106 
107 
Above n 101, 719. 
For example see: J Cartwright Unequal Bargaining (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991); 
Stewart, above n 67; Seddon, above n 2. 
Universe Tankshivs, above n 1, 401 per Lord Scannan. 
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Court of Appeal in this case of the possibility of "lawful act duress"· is not 
new. 109 Provided that the courts formulate a coherent basis for the illegitimacy 
inquiry this area of the law of duress will provide valuable and justifiable 
protection for those subject to technically lawful but morally or commercially 
unacceptable pressure. 
In the United States the case law is divided as to whether threats to do 
what one is lawfully entitled to do can constitute duress. 110 The confusion that 
reigns is clearly illustrated by the statement of the Texas Court of Appeals in the 
case of Mathews v Mathews 111 that: 
It is never duress to threaten to do that which one has a legal right to do ... . However, a 
vice arises when one employs extortive measures or, lacking good faith, makes 
improper demands. 
However, Palmer112 acknowledges that threats of lawful action may be 
regarded as wrongful because of the end sought. Similarly, the Restatement of 
the Law of Contracts provides that a threat will be improper for the purposes of 
the duress inquiry where the resulting exchange is not on fair terms and "what is 
threatened is ... a use of power for illegitimate ends." 113 This illustrates the 
interaction of the two limbs of Lord Scarman's test and reinforces the fact that 
neither limb can be considered in complete isolation when determining 
illegitimacy of pressure. That lawful threats may give rise to illegitimate or 
improper pressure would appear to be the preferable view. To lay down a 
blanket rule that threats of lawful action can never ground a claim of economic 
duress would result in a blunt doctrine, insufficiently flexible to differentiate 
between the wide range of circumstances in which its operation is demanded. In 
order for the illegitimacy inquiry to align with the justifications for the doctrine 
109 
110 
111 
See, for example, the cases at n 103 and Shivas v Bank of New 7-ealand, above n 101. 
Kelsey-Hayes Co v Galtaco Redlaw Castings Corp 749 F Supp 794 (ED Mich 1990) 
and Stofer v First National Bank of Efji,ngham 571 NE 2d 157 (Ill App 5 Dist 1991) 
suppo1t the view that a threat to do a legal act can, in certain circumstances amount to 
economic duress. To the contrary are cases such as Lebeck v Lebeck 881 P 2d 727 
(NM App 1994) in which the Court held that "[a] lawful demand or a threat to do that 
which the demanding party has a right to demand is not sufficient to support a claim 
of duress." Similarly the courts in Cochrane v Ernst & Young 758 Fed Supp 1548 
(ED Mich 1991) and Liebelt v Liebelt 801 P 2d 52 (Idaho App 1990) clearly state that 
a threat to do that which there is a right to do cannot ground a claim of economic 
duress. 
725 SW 2d 275, 279 (Tex App - Hous f1 Distl 1986). 
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of duress it must consider all the circumstances of a particular case and not 
attempt to define narrowly the factors to be taken into account when determining 
illegitimacy. 
So it should not be the threat alone which determines illegitimacy of 
pressure, the circumstances in which a lawful threat is made can render such a 
threat illegitimate. Similarly, it can be argued, the circumstances in which an 
unlawful threat, such as a threat to breach a contract, is made can mean that the 
resulting pressure will not be considered illegitimate. 
It is clear that threats to breach a contract will not always amount to legal 
duress. 114 Lord Scarman in Pao On made it clear that such threats will only 
amount to duress where there has been a coercion of the will. 115 Kerr LJ 
expressed a similar view (although in more modem terminology) when he said 
in B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd: 116 
I also bear in mind that a threat to break a contract unless money is paid by the other 
party can, but by no means always will, constitute duress. It appears from the 
authorities that it will only constitute duress if the consequences of a refusal would be 
serious and immediate so that there is no reasonable alternative open, such as by legal 
redress, obtaining an injunction, etc. 
Comments such as these suggest that all threats to breach a contract are 
viewed by the courts as constituting illegitimate pressure and it is the second 
stage of the duress inquiry (the existence of alternatives) that is determinative of 
the existence of economic duress. 117 
However, there are strong arguments to be made that threats to breach a 
contract ought not to be considered to automatically result in illegitimate 
pressure. The test for illegitimacy of pressure is two-pronged. One must look 
to the threat and the demand. The nature of the threat ought not to be 
determinative where a threat is unlawful any more than it is where the threat is of 
lawful action. This is made clear by subsequent formulations of the illegitimacy 
114 
115 
116 
For example see Pao On, above n 6. 
Above n 6, 635 . 
Above n 95, 428. 
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test. Tipping Jin Shivas v Bank of New Zealand118 reiterated Lord Scarman's 
test and while he commented that "usually" no difficulty arises in the illegitimacy 
inquiry where the threat is unlawful, he stressed the need to consider "all the 
circumstances" .119 In Foster v Phillips, 120 Master Hansen formulated the 
inquiry as whether the pressure was illegitimate "in the sense that both the nature 
of the pressure and the demands made ... were such that the law should not 
regard the pressure as legitimate" (emphasis added). 
Birks' views unlawfulness as a powerfully persuasive guide to the 
illegitimacy inquiry but states that it is not conclusive. According to Birks 
"[l]egitimate is a term capable of drawing on social morals, not just law." 121 
Greig and Davis argue that the basis of relief in cases of economic duress "is not 
that the contract should be unlawful by external standards, but that a contract has 
been concluded by means of a threat which is itself unconscionable." 122 
This attitude, it is submitted, accords with both common sense and 
commercial reality. The concept that unlawful threats will always be illegitimate 
appears to stem from the origins of duress in threats to the person. While such 
threats were unlawful, it was not their unlawfulness which gave rise to relief for 
duress. Relief was granted not because the threat was of illegal action but rather 
because the threat was directed at the denial of a fundamental right. If 
unlawfulness had been the basis of relief then logically duress would have 
extended to all unlawful threats. Common law duress was protecting 
fundamental and not merely legal rights. Similarly, unlawfulness was not the 
basis of relief in Equity. There it was unconscionability that was the driving 
force. 
Other commentators have also rejected the unlawful/illegitimate 
analogy. 123 As Seddon points out: 124 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
Above n 73. 
Above n 73, 345. 
Above n 74. 
Birks, above n 104. 
Greg and Davis, above n 24, 956. 
Goff and Jones, above n 7; R Clark Inequality of Bargaining Power: Judicial 
Intervention in Improvident and Unconscionable Bargains (Carswell, Toronto, 1987); 
Birks, above n 104; AS Burrows The Law of Restitution (Butterworths, London, 
1993); Stewart, above n 67. But to the contrary see N Rafferty "The Element of 
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If every threat of breach [of a contract] is automatically to be considered unacceptable 
for the purpose of the duress inquiry, it would mean that the boundaries of actionable 
duress would be far too wide.. .. If a threat to break a contract is regarded as 
unacceptable, then too many compromise agreements would be vulnerable to being 
set aside. 
Greig and Davis125 argue that a threat to breach a contract cannot, of 
itself, be sufficient because then any renegotiation of a contract could be 
subsequently set aside as every such renegotiation carries with it at least an 
implied threat not to continue with the existing contract. As Griffiths LJ said in 
B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications Ltd: 126 
Many commercial contracts are varied during their currency because the parties are 
faced with changing circumstances during the performance of the contract, and it is 
certainly not on every occasion when one of the parties unwillingly agrees to a 
variation that the law would consider that he had acted by reason of duress. The cases 
will have to be examined in light of their particular circumstances. 
Unlawfulness of the threat is, of course, an element of the illegitimacy inquiry 
(and a highly persuasive one) but it should not be decisive. 
2 The issue of good faith 
It is not just the need to consider the second limb of the illegitimacy 
inquiry that makes it clear that a threat to breach a contract is not, of itself, 
illegitimate. The manner in which the threat is made also plays an important 
role. In Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd, 127 Tucker 
J seems to implicitly accept that a threat to breach a contract did not, of itself, 
constitute illegitimate pressure. In that case the defendant was an importer of 
basketware and had secured a contract to sell and deliver the basketware to a 
national firm. The plaintiff was a carrier who contracted with the defendant to 
deliver the baskets at £1. 10 per carton based on their own estimation of a 
minimum of 400 cartons per load. Actual load sizes were found to be only 200 
cartons and so the plaintiff attempted, without success, to persuade the 
defendant to vary the agreement. Four days later the plaintiff sent an empty 
125 Above n 24, 957. 
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lorry to the defendant's premises with a message that the lorry would leave 
empty unless the defendant agreed to vary the original contract. The defendant 
attempted to contact the plaintiff but the plaintiffs manager had absented himself 
from the office. The defendant signed the agreement and subsequently refused 
to pay. The plaintiff brought an action to recover the money it believed was 
owmg. 
Tucker J held that this was clearly a case of economic duress. There was 
no question but that the pressure brought to bear was illegitimate. The plaintiff 
had asserted no legal justification for the threat to breach the contract, it was 
aware of the impossibility of the situation it put the defendant in (there was no 
chance of making alternative arrangements and the defendant's buyer would 
have sued if the goods were not delivered and this would have ruined the 
defendant), it left communication of the threat to a third party and the plaintiffs 
manager made himself unavailable to the defendant at the time when the 
ultimatum was given. The pressure was illegitimate when considered in the 
context of the smTounding circumstances. 
It was clear from the facts of Atlas Express that what was threatened was 
a breach of contract. However, Tucker J did not stop his inquiry at that point. 
He felt the need to go further and consider the manner in which the pressure was 
exerted. As Chandler128 points out, the conclusion that the pressure was 
illegitimate came only after Tucker J had considered a number of factors. The 
further factors considered by Tucker J clearly illustrate bad faith on the part of 
Atlas. 129 
B The Nature of the Demand 
It is not only in terms of the nature of the pressure that the issue of bad 
faith comes into play. Bad faith appears to have a pivotal role in determining the 
nature of the demand. The distinction between bad faith as a component of the 
nature of the pressure and bad faith with respect to the demand does not appear 
to have been expressly acknowledged. Bad faith is usually regarded as a 
component of the illegitimacy inquiry in a general way. 130 However, it is clear 
128 
129 
PA Chandler "Economic Duress - Clarity or Confusion" [1990) Lloyds Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 270. 
Though Bun-ows, above n 123, inexplicably contends that there was no obvious bad 
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that bad faith will relate either to the manner in which the threat is made, or to the 
nature of the demand and it is conceptually useful to distinguish between the 
two. 
The decision in B & S Contracts Ltd131 illustrates the role of bad faith in 
determining the nature of the demand. In that case the plaintiffs had agreed to 
erect stands for the defendants for an exhibition. The contract contained a clause 
providing that the plaintiffs would make every effort to carry out the contract but 
its due performance was subject to variation or cancellation in the event of, 
among other things, a strike. The workers that the plaintiffs arranged to put up 
the stands worked for a subsidiary of the plaintiffs but had recently been given 
redundancy notices. Once the workers had arrived at the site they refused to 
proceed with the work unless their demand for £9000 severance pay (to which 
they were not entitled) was met. The plaintiffs then approached the defendants 
and threatened to cancel the contract unless the defendants paid half that sum. 
The plaintiffs would not accept an offer by the defendants to advance them 
£4500 of the contract price and so the defendants paid the money. However, the 
defendants subsequently deducted £4500 from the invoice price before paying. 
The plaintiff sued to recover the £4500. 
The Court of Appeal had no difficulty finding operative economic duress 
in this case. The members of the Court emphasised the bad faith exhibited by 
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs did not refuse to pay as a matter of principle, they 
simply did not want to reduce the sum that they would have received for the 
contract. 132 The sum they required "was put on the table and available to the 
plaintiffs. But they decided not to accept it on the terms offered; they wanted it 
as extra .... "133 The Court held that it would have been reasonable for the 
plaintiffs to have met the cost. Clearly, on the facts, the plaintiffs had taken 
advantage of the defendants' vulnerable position to force them to pay the £4500. 
Goff and Jones 134 also see a role for the concept of bad faith in relation 
to the demand. However, they see it more as a lack of good faith. They pose 
the question: what should be the position where the threatener believed that it 
was commercially reasonable to ask for a variation of an existing contract? They 
131 
132 
Above, n 96. 
As per Griffiths LJ, above n 96, 426. 
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give as an example the builder who finds hidden horrors in the sub-soil, while 
digging the foundations of a building. In such circumstances the builder might 
think it justifiable to demand extra remuneration to complete the work. As 
Palmer and Catchpole point out: 135 
It can therefore be very hard on a contractor, who genuinely and reasonably believes 
that he has a valid excuse for non-performance and who seeks to effectuate what 
amounts, in his view, to a legitimate renegotiation of the contract, to characterise too 
readily his declaration of intention to cease performance on the original terms as a 
threat to do something "illegitimate." 
Palmer and Catchpole favour a test for the illegitimacy of threats to 
breach a contract similar to that proposed by Goff and Jones: that legitimacy be 
judged according to whether the threatener honestly and reasonably believed in 
the validity of the claim. Palmer and Catchpole appear to be focusing on a belief 
in the legal validity of the claim, however, a flexible and responsive doctrine 
ought also to consider the commercial validity of the claim. This is an approach 
which finds supp01t in the United States. 
Bad faith, or lack of good faith, features prominently in the United States 
in determining whether pressure is improper for the purposes of economic 
duress. It is clear that the existence of bad faith in respect of the demand is one 
of the factors in considering the wrongfulness of a threat of lawful action. 136 
Similarly it would seem that bad faith plays a role in determining whether a 
threat of illegal action amounts to an improper threat. 
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts provides that a threat will be 
improper if it "is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a 
contract.. .. " 137 The Restatement goes on to explain that: 138 
135 
136 
... the "extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate commercial reason is 
ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith .. .. The test of 'good faith' between 
Palmer and Catchpole "lndusllial Conflict, Breach of Contract and Duress" (1985) 48 
Modem Law Review 102, 106. 
See Southmark Properties v Charles House Corp 742 F 2d 862 (CA La 1984); 
Carpenter v US 4 Cl Ct 705 (Cl Ct 1984); Gruever v Midas International Corp, 
above n 94. 
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merchants or as against merchants includes 'observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing in the trade' .... and may in some cases require an objectively 
demonstrable reason for seeking a modification .... " 
The comments of the California Appeals Court in Rich & WhiUock Inc v 
Ashton Development Inc 139 are illustrative of the role of bad faith in the 
wrongful threat/illegitimacy inquiry. The Court in that case held that "a bad-faith 
threat to breach a contract...may constitute a wrongful act for the purposes of 
economic duress" (emphasis added). To the same effect is the case of Zebedeo 
v Martin E Segal Co lnc140 in which the Court held that "[w]here one party 
insists upon a contractual provision, which it honestly believes itself entitled to, 
unless such belief is patently unreasonable, conduct cannot be wrongful, and 
thus cannot constitute duress." 
C Identifying Bad Faith Demands 
While bad faith in the manner in which the threat is made is easily 
identifiable (as in Atlas Express), bad faith in the nature of the demand can be 
harder to identify. TI1e lack of any reasonable legal or commercial grounds for 
the making of a demand will be the key to identifying a bad faith demand. 
Along with the factors discussed above, there are others that may be relevant to 
this inquiry. 
1 The necessity of the threatener 
This factor appears to be strikingly absent from commonwealth caselaw. 
An obvious example is Atlas Express Ltd. In that case there was certainly bad 
faith in the manner in which the threat to breach the contract was made. 
However, the Judge completely failed to consider the position of the threatener 
(Atlas). What would have been the effect on that company had it performed the 
contract as originally entered? Would it have simply resulted in a lesser profit or 
a bearable loss, or would it have forced the company into insolvency? 
Arguably, where a threatener is placed in an impossible situation, where there is 
no reasonable alternative, a demand for a variation of the contract makes 
commercial sense and illegitimacy ought not to be found to exist. 141 
139 157 CA 3d 1154 (Cal App 4 Dist 1984). 
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Burrows 142 suggests that a threat to breach a contract should be 
considered legitimate where it is aimed at merely correcting what was always a 
bad bargain. However, such a low threshold can not be justified. If the test 
were formulated on this basis the courts would be required to protect people 
from their bad bargains. Nothing more would need to be proved by the 
threatener than that the tenns of the original contract were unfair. There would 
be no requirement to show that undue hardship would result from the 
performance of the contract on those terms and no requirement to show that the 
threatened party had unconscionably obtained those terms. Such a test would be 
completely contrary to the basis of the free market system in which we operate. 
2 Substantive fairness 
Justification for a demand can only exist where the demand is reasonably 
necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the threatener. Thus the concept 
of proportionality is relevant to the question of bad faith. In relation to 
threatened breaches of contract, Sutton identifies the need for "oppressive 
conduct which goes beyond what is reasonably necessary to protect the 
[threatener's] legitimate interests" 143. The fairness of the renegotiated terms 
may be a good indication of the existence of bad faith. Terms that provide a 
windfall for the threatener at the victim's expense, rather than simply righting 
some imbalance, are unlikely to satisfy the good faith requirement. 
Burrows rejects the idea of substantive fairness as a test for illegitimacy 
on the grounds that such a test would result in a narrow doctrine of economic 
duress as "it will be rare for terms proposed by a party threatening a breach of 
contract to fall outside the possible bounds of fairness. "144 However, it is not 
necessary, or desirable to view substantive fairness as determinative of the 
illegitimacy inquiry. Rather it is merely one factor in determining the existence 
of bad faith and as such it can play a valuable role. The existence of 
substantively fair terms will not preclude the operation of the doctrine of 
economic duress where other factors demand its application. 
In addition, a rejection of any role for substantive fairness in determining 
the existence of duress draws a sharp dividing line between substantive and 
142 Above n 123. 
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procedural matters. In Brighouse v Bilderbeck145 Cooke P, in the context of 
examining the duties of a reasonable employer, stated that it is wrong to 
distinguish between the reason for a dismissal and the manner of dismissal. 
Both substantive and procedural matters are relevant in determining whether a 
dismissal is unjustified. Similarly, in determining the existence of economic 
duress, both the substance of an agreement and the manner in which it came 
about will be relevant. 
D Summary 
Bad faith is the key to establishing a workable test for the existence of 
economic duress where there is a threatened breach of contract. 146 It is the 
touchstone for illegitimacy and its existence, where there is a threat to breach a 
contract, is determinative of illegitimacy. As the British Columbia Court of 
145 
146 
[1994] 2 ERNZ 243. 
It has been suggested in a recent text that in establishing duress "[t]be defendant does 
not have to be shown to have behaved badly and has indeed often acted in absolutely 
good faitJ1." See P Birks and Chin Nyuk Yin in "The Nature of Undue Influence" in J 
Beatson and D Friedmann Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1995) 62. However, the authorities cited by the authors for this statement 
relate solely to cases of duress to the person and duress of goods. As already discussed 
in this paper tJ1e requirement of illegitimacy is already established in respect of threats 
of that tvne and so no issue of Qood faith arises. It is onlv the exnansion of duress 
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Appeal in Harry v Kreutziger147 stated: 
[The] single question is whether the transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently 
divergent from community standards of commercial morality that it should be 
rescinded. 
A test based on bad faith achieves the appropriate balance between the 
aims of duress and the need for commercial certainty. Commercial reality 
dictates that not every threat to breach a contract should automatically be 
considered to result in illegitimate pressure. There will be times when such a 
threat will be made and the victim will have no alternative but to submit and yet 
the doctrine ought not to operate to provide relief. This may appear harsh but 
the law must be appropriate to the "deliberate and ruthless" 148 nature of the 
commercial world. A test of bad faith achieves this as even in the deliberate and 
ruthless commercial world bad faith is to be abhorred. 
So what is this bad faith that we look for when there has been a demand 
accompanied by a threat to breach a contract? The bad faith may be in the 
manner in which the threat was made, as in Alas Express, or it may relate to the 
demand itself, as in B & S Contracts. Notwithstanding the decision in Atlas 
Express, bad faith in the manner in which a threat is made ought not to be 
determinative of illegitimacy. Consideration must be given to the second limb of 
the illegitimacy inquiry. A good faith basis for the demand made in Atlas 
Express would have gone some way to negating the effect of the bad faith 
involved in the manner in which the threat was made and the reasoning of the 
Court is weakened by its failure to consider this point. 149 
Bad faith in the nature of the demand clearly rests on the concept of 
justification: was the threatener legally or commercially justified in making the 
demand? As such, it is important to note that the term "bad faith" is not 
restricted to positive acts of bad faith but extends to a lack of good faith in 
making the demand. There is a lack of good faith when a demand is made in the 
absence of any reasonably held belief of legal or commercial justification. The 
requirement of good faith goes not only to the actual making of the threat itself 
14 7 (1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231, 241. 
148 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Provrietarv Co Ltd (1989) 167 
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but also to the extent of the demand. Even where there are legal or commercial 
justifications for the making of a demand, if what is demanded goes beyond 
what is reasonable in the circumstances then there will be bad faith. 
Determination of these issues should not be unduly difficult. The claim 
of a reasonable held belief in a legal justification will pose no problem to the 
couns. The courts are often required to adjudicate on the reasonableness of 
beliefs and the law is their province. Of more difficulty is the determination of 
the reasonableness of a commercial justification. However, with the increased 
awareness of commercial issues amongst the judiciary and consideration of 
evidence of industry practice the inquiry is well within the ability of the courts. 
Where there is a threatened breach of contract the bad faith test will apply 
m the following manner to determine whether the resulting pressure is 
illegitimate: 
(a) If a threat to breach a contract is made in good faith, based on reasonably 
held commercial or legal ground, the pressure resulting from such a 
threat will not to be characterised as illegitimate. 
(b) Where there is bad faith in both the manner in which the threat is made 
and in the demand made then a finding of illegitimate pressure is 
inevitable. 
(c) Where there is no bad faith in the manner in which the threat is made but 
the demand is tainted with bad faith, the resulting pressure will be 
illegitimate. 
(d) Where there is bad faith in the manner in which the threat is made but the 
demand itself is justified, the Court must balance the nature of the 
justification with the extent of the bad faith. Where the conduct is highly 
unconscionable, a compelling justification must be shown to avoid a 
finding of illegitimacy. 
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VIII CONCLUSION 
Economic duress represents one of the many areas of the law in which 
the courts have demonstrated an increased willingness to grant relief in respect 
of unfair or unfairly obtained bargains. However, this doctrine is still in its 
infancy and as such it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between economic 
duress that renders a contract voidable and mere legitimate commercial pressure 
which will not ground a claim for relief. In order to formulate coherent and 
consistent principles for the application of economic duress it is essential that the 
overborne will theory be cast aside. The modern test formulated by Lord 
Scarrnan in Universe Tankships provides a potential framework for a principled 
approach to economic duress. However, the courts have failed to clearly define 
the concept of illegitimacy thereby decreasing commercial certainty, one of the 
very things that the judges seem at pains to protect. A clearer picture of the 
limits of legitimate commercial pressure can only benefit commerce by providing 
more certainty to commercial parties caught in what may appear to be impossible 
situations. 
The bad faith test for illegitimacy proposed in this paper goes some way 
to narrowing the grey area of uncertainty which blights the doctrine of economic 
duress. It does not, however, completely remove the uncertainty involved in the 
application of the doctrine and it would not be desirable for it to do so. The 
uncertainty that remains provides discretion for the courts which is vital for a 
flexible and workable doctrine. This is yet another balance that must be 
maintained. Too much uncenainty results in confusion and lack of faith in the 
rule, but too little will result in a harsh and inflexible doctrine ill suited to the role 
that we would have economic duress play. 
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